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Introduction by Douglas Little, Clark University 
 
n 19 July 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry helicoptered into Ramallah, the West 
Bank town just north of Jerusalem that houses the headquarters of the Palestinian 
Authority, where he tried to persuade President Mahmoud Abbas that the time was 
ripe to resurrect the stalemated Middle East peace process.  Four decades earlier, Kerry 
had been an angry young Navy veteran who unexpectedly emerged as an eloquent critic of 
America’s war against Vietnamese revolutionary nationalism while Abbas had been a 
smooth-talking lawyer who secretly served as a leading strategist for the Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s (PLO) war of national liberation against Israel.  In his path-
breaking new book, the University of Kentucky’s Paul Chamberlin argues that these two 
liberation movements— the Palestinian and the Vietnamese—were manifestations of a 
much broader “global offensive” against imperialism that crested between 1967 and 1975.  
While heroic Cuban, Algerian, and Vietnamese guerrillas had dominated the headlines 
during the 1960s, Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Fedayeen would come to symbolize the 
struggle of the Global South to achieve self-determination and national independence 
during the 1970s.  Utilizing material from the PLO archives in Beirut, Chamberlin seeks to 
transform the Palestinians from bit players into leading actors who launched “the world’s 
first globalized insurgency and became a seminal influence on other rebellions in the 
following decades” (3).  In so doing, Chamberlin has given us a book that might serve as a 
model for studying what he likes to call “globalization from the bottom up” (261). 
  
All four participants in this roundtable welcome Chamberlin’s retelling of a relatively 
familiar episode in diplomatic history from the largely neglected Palestinian end of the 
telescope.   Bradley Simpson praises The Global Offensive not merely for turning the 
conventional narrative upside down and giving voice and agency to the Palestinians, but 
also for highlighting the PLO’s pivotal role in pushing national self-determination for the 
peoples of the Third World to the top of the agenda at  the United Nations and other 
international organizations.  By positioning the PLO in the vanguard of a global offensive 
against colonialism and imperialism during the 1970s, Yasser Arafat sought to avoid being 
branded as a garden variety terrorist and to place himself instead on the right side of 
history as the great liberator of the world’s oppressed.  Arafat largely succeeded in 
rebranding himself in Western Europe, Africa, and Latin America, where the Palestinian 
struggle against Israel was interpreted as a reenactment of the ancient battle between 
David and Goliath, with the PLO playing the part of the brave young man with the slingshot.  
In Washington and Tel Aviv, however, the PLO’s increasingly violent tactics, its ties to 
Moscow and Beijing, and its support for other guerrilla movements in the Third World led 
American and Israeli officials to cooperate closely on a global strategy of 
counterinsurgency.  
 
William Quandt, by contrast, is less enamored with Chamberlin’s new venture into 
transnational history, which he feels gives short shrift to national narratives.   Although 
Quandt agrees that the many Arabic-language sources in The Global Offensive provide a 
refreshing corrective for previous ‘the world according to Washington’ accounts, he 
nevertheless feels that the international comparative framework at the heart of the book 
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fails to capture fully the complexity and intensity of Palestinian politics, which were filled 
with intrigue and factionalism.  Quandt, who served on the National Security Council staff 
during the early 1970s, also disputes Chamberlin’s assertion that Arafat and other top 
Palestinian leaders were not responsible for atrocities committed by Black September 
terrorists.    Alluding to still-classified American intelligence reports, Quandt says that the 
massacre of the Israeli Olympic team at Munich in September 1972 and the cold-blooded 
murder of Cleo Noel, the U.S. ambassador to Sudan, at the Saudi embassy in Khartoum six 
months later, were in fact authorized by high-ranking PLO officials and were not merely 
rogue operations launched by Palestinian extremists outside Arafat’s control.  
Like Quandt, Craig Daigle has mixed feelings about The Global Offensive.  On the one hand, 
he applauds Chamberlin for recapturing the PLO’s revolutionary élan, which resonated 
with the ideologies of other Third World national liberation movements during the late 
1960s, and he likens The Global Offensive to Jeremi Suri’s Power and Protest, another 
innovative book which places the political upheavals that rocked the Cold War status quo 
into comparative context.1   On the other hand, Daigle believes that Chamberlin has 
misread the policies of the Nixon administration, not only toward the PLO but also toward 
the entire region.  In response to Chamberlin’s claim that “Nixon and Kissinger did not 
understand the dynamics in the Middle East and had little use for anyone who did” (106), 
Daigle argues that the diplomatic duo in the White House understood the region very well 
but purposely chose to ignore the Arabs and align themselves with Israel because of 
strategic calculations associated with détente.  I do not think Chamberlin would disagree 
with Daigle’s assertion that the ‘Cold War lens’ through which President Richard Nixon and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger viewed the Middle East affected their diplomatic vision 
during the early 1970s, but Chamberlin would probably argue that the Arab who taught 
U.S. officials their most important opthamological lesson about regional dynamics was 
Yasser Arafat, not Anwar Sadat. 
 
Jeffrey Byrne, whose own work on the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 
parallels Chamberlin’s account of the PLO, agrees that during the early 1970s the 
Palestinians emerged as a powerful symbolic link connecting the quest for self-
determination in North Africa with guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia.   By aligning the 
PLO with the FLN’s anticolonial struggle and the Vietnamese revolution, Yasser Arafat 
managed to strengthen his claim that Palestinians were waging a war of national liberation, 
not indulging in terrorism.  Byrne, however, wishes that Chamberlin had done more to 
examine the ways in which the PLO’s diplomatic strategy differed from those pursued by 
the Algerians and Vietnamese.  Was the Palestinian failure to achieve self-determination 
mainly a function of unfortunate timing (by 1975, the PLO faced a more clever United 
States chastened by unpleasant outcomes in Algeria and Vietnam) or rather the result of 
flawed Palestinian tactics at the bargaining table?  Byrne points out that both the Algerians 
and the Vietnamese warned the PLO never to agree to a ceasefire until its adversaries 
accepted its core demands and urged the Palestinians to proceed by fighting and talking 
simultaneously.  Arafat could not, or would not, heed this advice.   
1 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: The Global Revolutions of 1968 and the Origins of Détente (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003). 
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Whether or not they accept all of Paul Chamberlin’s findings, the four participants in this 
roundtable regard The Global Offensive as a remarkable book that should be required 
reading, not only for John Kerry and Mahmoud Abbas, but also for anyone seeking to 
understand recent U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world.  Looking at the stalemated peace 
process early in the twenty-first century, Chamberlin suggests that the Obama 
administration is trapped in a ‘Global War on Terror’ paradigm that in some ways 
resembles the Cold War paradigm that prevented the Nixon administration from breaking 
the deadlock in the Middle East.  Yet he holds PLO leaders partly responsible for their own 
predicament because they have been unable to unify the Palestinian resistance and 
unwilling to shed the revolutionary romanticism that once upon a time put them squarely 
in the vanguard of “the global offensive.”   In writing this book, he has also done something 
else of even greater importance.  By positioning the Palestinian struggle in the gray area 
between the heroic wars of national liberation during the twilight of the twentieth-century 
and the grim wars of ‘all against all’ waged by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda at the dawn of 
the new millennium, Paul Chamberlin has reminded us that those who do not know the 
past may well be doomed to repeat it. 
 
 
Participants: 
 
Paul Thomas Chamberlin is Associate Professor of History at the University of Kentucky. 
His first book, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order was published with Oxford University Press in 
2012. He is now working on a history of the Cold War in the Third World tentatively titled 
The Cold War’s Killing Fields. 
 
Douglas Little is the Robert and Virginia Scotland Professor of History and International 
Relations at Clark University, where he has taught since receiving his Ph.D. from Cornell 
University in 1978.  His articles on U.S. relations with the Middle East have appeared in the 
Journal of American History, Diplomatic History, the Middle East Journal, and the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies.  The third edition of his most recent book, 
American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (University of North 
Carolina Press), appeared in 2008 and was translated into Arabic in 2010.  His current 
research focuses on the United States and the rise of radical Islam during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
 
Jeffrey James Byrne is Assistant Professor of History at the University of British Columbia. 
His first book, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Project, is 
forthcoming from Oxford University Press. He has written on the modern international 
history of the developing world for Diplomatic History, The International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, and numerous collected volumes. 
 
Craig Daigle is an Assistant Professor of History at the City College of New York, where he 
teaches courses on American Foreign Relations, the Cold War, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
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He is the author of The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973 (Yale University Press, 2012). 
 
William B. Quandt holds the Edward R. Stettinius chair in the Department of Politics at the 
University of Virginia. He teaches courses on the Middle East and American Foreign 
Policy.  Quandt served as a staff member on the National Security Council (1972-1974, 
1977-1979). He was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp David 
Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.  Quandt’s books include: Peace Process: 
American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967(Brookings, 2005, third 
edition);  Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism, 
(Brookings, 1998);  The United States and Egypt: An Essay on Policy for the 1990s 
(Brookings, 1990); Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Brookings, 1986); Saudi Arabia 
in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil (Brookings, 1981); Decade of Decisions: 
American Foreign Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (University of 
California Press, 1977); and Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (MIT 
Press, 1969). He also edited The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David (Brookings, 1988) 
and Troubled Triangle:  The United States, Turkey and Israel in the New Middle East (Just 
World Books, 2011). 
 
Brad Simpson is Associate Professor of History and Asian studies at the University of 
Connecticut. He is the author of Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-
Indonesian Relations (2008), and is currently working on two books:  an international 
history of Indonesian authoritarianism from 1966-1998, and a global history of the idea of 
self-determination. 
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Review by Jeffrey James Byrne, University of British Columbia 
aul Chamberlin provides a refreshing perspective on the history of Palestinian 
nationalism with The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order. Chamberlin explains that 
his extremely thought-provoking endeavour takes neither a Palestinian-centric nor a U.S.-
Middle East relations-oriented approach. Instead, he seeks to situate the history of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 1960s and 1970s within the context of 
that era’s global ‘Third Worldist’ revolutionary trend, a trend that the PLO was very much 
part of spiritually and politically (9). Indeed the book essentially uses the Palestinian 
question, from 1967-1975, as a window into that larger phenomenon. Chamberlin argues 
that the PLO was more than simply representative of the Third World revolutionary 
trend—it was one of its most important manifestations and the key to a watershed moment 
in that phenomenon’s evolution. In his view, the Palestinian nationalist struggle was one of 
the Third World’s “first great stalemates” after the mostly triumphant years of the 1950s 
and 1960s, auguring the Third World’s gradual “Balkanization” and tactical shift to the 
practice of “international terrorism” (6).  
 
In that respect, The Global Offensive makes a laudable contribution to the growing body of 
scholarship that places the developing world and transnational actors at the forefront of 
international politics, rather than treating them as peripheral, secondary actors or 
curiosities. Its author points to the recent work of historians such as Odd Arne Westad and 
Erez Manela, whose Global Cold War and Wilsonian Moment, respectively, serve as 
inspirations for key aspects of his own conceptual and methodological approach. This 
reviewer is very sympathetic to Chamberlin’s insistence on the importance of using the 
appropriate non-Western sources in the pursuit of this kind of history instead of relying on 
the records of British, French, American and other such countries’ diplomatic 
bureaucracies to tell African, Middle Eastern, or Asian stories. Of course, exotic new 
sources are not magic bullets with the intrinsic power to knock down existing paradigms, 
but Chamberlin’s use of frequently overlooked Arabic language and PLO literature 
unquestionably adds a great deal to this study. Without them, he probably could not have 
achieved his goal of returning the Palestinian liberation struggle to its “appropriate place in 
the history of the twentieth century world” (9).      
 
The book’s chronological structure works well, with its narrative hanging on several 
convincing turning points from the 1967 Arab-Israel War to the beginning of the Lebanese 
Civil War in 1975. That said, the first chapter is probably the least satisfying. In it, 
Chamberlin sets the scene, beginning in the wake of Egypt’s and the other Arab nation’s 
catastrophic defeat in the Six Days’ War against Israel. Appropriately, the chapter takes a 
broad survey of the global terrain, noting the divergent interests of Yasir Arafat’s Fatah and 
the Arab states that supported it, Fatah’s identification with Third Worldism and the 
Algerian and Vietnamese revolutionary examples, as well as the perspectives of the two 
superpowers and the Israeli government. “Arafat embraced this new global political 
geography”, Chamberlin explains, situating Palestinian nationalism within a global anti-
colonial movement and Israel as firmly integrated into the Western imperial system (21).  
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The chapter therefore evokes the complex nature of Palestinian-Arab relations particularly 
well—a major strength of the book overall—and in general the author’s framing is right on 
target for this ambitious type of international history. However, perhaps the sheer 
complexity of the scene that Chamberlin wishes to establish is somewhat overwhelming, as 
I did find that this first chapter had too much of a descriptive, impressionistic feel at the 
expense of setting a clear analytical foundation for the rest of the book.  
 
The second chapter shows how the 1967 war and the PLO’s public relations victory at the 
Battle of Al-Karama, when Israeli units pursued Palestinian fighters into Jordan, enabled 
Fatah and other guerrilla-oriented groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) to take control of the broader nationalist movement while at the same 
time fully integrating themselves in the Third World scene. Chamberlin takes advantage of 
some particularly compelling primary source material to show how Palestinian nationalists 
took inspiration from the Algerian and South Vietnamese National Liberation Fronts and 
established valuable new relations with the Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Cuban 
governments. The latter were important sources of diplomatic and material assistance. The 
connection of Fatah, especially to the Third World scene, was therefore a conceptual, 
philosophical, and ideological one as well as being very practical and substantive.  
 
However, a vital issue that Chamberlin establishes early on was Fatah’s failure to heed its 
new allies’ advice to create a united national front (71). Instead, Arafat assumed leadership 
of the PLO in 1969 without unifying it in front-like fashion, a goal that frequently 
necessitated much bloodshed in other instances such as the Algerian precedent. Groups 
like the PFLP would continue to pursue their own agendas under the umbrella of the PLO, 
with George Habash’s outfit taking the lead in new international terrorist tactics such as 
airplane hijackings. In this sense, the Palestinian nationalist movement did start to acquire 
a subtly different, more “diffuse” character in comparison to some of the foreign 
organisations that it sought to imitate but which had a clearer territorial area of operations. 
The Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), for example, struggled greatly with the 
organizational challenges that its undeniably effective transnational strategy entailed: 
diffusion encouraged schism, while the various host governments of the FLN’s different 
branches sought to cultivate their own clients inside the movement. Throughout its 
chapters, The Global Offensive very effectively conveys some of the downsides of 
transnationalism; while some studies have a tendency to conflate the ‘Arab’ perspective, 
Chamberlin’s narrative clearly delineates the interests of groups like Fatah from those of 
the states that assisted them. 
 
In that respect, some of the most compelling passages of the book concern the ability of the 
transnational Palestinian groups to destabilize sovereign states, most notably Jordan and 
Lebanon. Of course, the destabilizing potential of transnational entities was particularly 
acute for the new states created from the detritus of the Ottoman Empire: Syria, Lebanon, 
Iraq, Israel, and Palestine. In 1970, the PFLP effectively vied with King Hussein for control 
of Jordan, a country invented by Britain that abounded with Palestinian refugees. “We are 
calling the shots in Jordan”, Habash’s PFLP declared, although in the end Hussein 
demonstrated the wherewithal to eject the PLO from Jordanian territory (116-7). Arafat 
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criticizes the PFLP for having instigated the confrontation in the first place, although it 
would be interesting to know if Chamberlin agrees with that criticism. After all, surely the 
strongest card the Palestinians had to play was their ability to destabilize regional politics. 
When the Black September splinter group assassinated the Jordanian prime minister the 
following year, a senior Fatah-PLO figure admitted that, “I have to say they were wrong … 
but I have also to understand them … [T]he world was saying to us Palestinians ‘we don’t 
give a damn about you, and we won’t care at least until you are a threat to our 
interests’”(149-50). 
 
Interestingly, The Global Offensive reframes Richard Nixon’s “regional policeman” approach 
to the Third World as a defense of a conservative, state-centric conception of the 
international system—a framing that is of course fully consistent with Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger’s enthusiasm for the realist school of diplomacy (78-80). With the sovereign 
capital-oriented nature of shuttle diplomacy, their pursuit of a Middle Eastern peace 
process took on the quality of not just supporting certain favoured states, but also 
supporting the existing regional state system itself against the subversive peril posed by 
the Palestinians. Israel fit the “policeman” policy well in terms of its state-centric approach 
to international relations, since Prime Minister Golda Meir refuted the validity of 
Palestinian nationalism and Tel Aviv insisted on dealing exclusively with Arab capitals on 
the grounds that the Palestinian question was simply a terrorist-refugee problem. 
 
On the same theme, Chamberlin’s examination of the UN’s ‘terrorism’ debate is one of the 
strongest sections of the book. The Afro-Asian governments pushed back against the U.S.-
led efforts to enshrine anti-terrorist principles in the world organization, in the end 
managing to subvert the entire process by including criticism of ‘state terrorism’ by 
colonial and racist regimes in the final approved resolutions (171-182). In so doing, the 
Third World countries prevented the Western powers from establishing an inherently 
superior moral legitimacy of states with respect to transnational movements. This episode 
perhaps constitutes the book’s clearest demonstration of the Palestinian question’s effect 
on the structures of global society, as opposed to its more regional consequences 
(significant as they were).     
 
I find some of Chamberlin’s explanations for the PLO’s failure to achieve an independent 
Palestine to be interesting because his logic runs counter to the Third Worldist, 
revolutionary doctrine that supposedly motivated Arafat and his comrades in arms at the 
time. For example, he criticizes the PLO leadership for missing opportunities to engage in 
peace negotiations in 1973 on account of their refusal to make necessary fundamental 
concessions, saying that they “clung to the rhetoric of total victory through popular 
revolution” and were “unable to commit to a political solution” (264). However, the 
Algerian FLN and the Vietnamese communist-nationalists each clung determinedly to the 
policy of “talk while fighting” even after agreeing to engage in negotiations with their 
8 | P a g e  
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French or American foes.1 The key, as the Algerians, Chinese, and Vietnamese all stressed 
to the Palestinians, was to never agree to a ceasefire before the other side consented to 
your core goals. Rather depressingly from the perspective of a Palestinian nationalist, as 
early as 1958 one of the Algerian FLN’s leaders observed to his colleagues that they could 
never abandon the guerrilla campaign—despite its rapidly deteriorating fortunes in a 
strictly military sense—because only violence and disorder provoked greater political 
forces to care about their cause. “There would hardly be any need for a wider policy and to 
waste time in chancelleries and international events”, he warned. “All will be lost, 
irredeemably lost. Algeria will become a new Palestine.”2 Accordingly, by the dictates of the 
revolutionary model to which the Palestinian nationalists claimed to aspire, the PLO’s 
eventual error was actually agreeing to the peace process before first securing its key goals 
(whether that be a ‘ministate’ or single-state solution).  
 
I must note at this point that contemplation of these issues does not depend on any 
convictions about the innate legitimacy of either the Israeli or Palestinian positions; nor 
would I personally advocate that any movement employ the Third Worldist revolutionary 
strategy given the extent of human suffering that it necessitates. Still, one of the most 
fascinating traits of the era of decolonization is the striking malleability of international 
structures and the contingency of certain outcomes that acquired a much great aura of 
legitimacy or inevitability after the fact. I would disagree with the author’s suggestion that 
the Palestinian nationalist cause differed from its Vietnamese or Algerian inspirations 
because it was “not an immediate consequence of imperial collapse” and thus “retained a 
certain moral ambiguity” (260). On moral ambiguity, I certainly concur, but I question the 
notion that Algerian, Vietnamese, Kenyan, or for that matter Zionist nationalism boasted 
any more innate justness or validity (to cite some scenarios that also featured a significant 
degree of popular participation and violent methods). One of the wonderful qualities of 
decolonization is that the legitimacy of a national project is certified by its success, yet we 
then often account for that success on the basis of the project’s legitimacy. The new 
international order was premised on a circular logic, and winners took all. Was Fatah’s 
failure due to its inability to definitively choose one path and instead awkwardly straddle 
the dictates of both revolutionary subversion and international respectability? 
 
In any case, it is a testament to The Global Offensive’s value that it provokes such 
contemplations. Its author has succeeded in his goal of making an important contribution 
to the international history of the developing world. By situating the Palestinian nationalist 
movement within the larger Third Worldist trend, Chamberlin simultaneously yields new 
insights into both. His study peels back the rhetoric of Arab unity and Afro-Asianism to 
reveal the complexities and tensions that bedeviled Third-World politics, especially 
concerning the divergent agendas of various Arab governments and the transnational PLO. 
1 For example, see Report Presented to the 15 Plenum of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party Central Committee, 
29 August 1968, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) digital archive, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113979. 
2 Mohammed Harbi, Le FLN: Mirage Et Réalité (Paris: E� ditions Jeune Afrique, 1980), pp.218-23. 
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Meanwhile, for an issue that has acquired the impression of stasis and intractability, 
Chamberlin also reminds us that the Israel-Palestine question only very recently issued 
from an era of extreme dynamism and instability. With the integrity of countries such as 
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq once again coming under threat, The Global Offensive is 
also a timely reminder of the challenge that transnational movements from below can pose 
to the postcolonial state system. 
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Review by Craig Daigle, City College of New York 
n November 13, 1974, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), proclaimed from the rostrum of the United Nations General 
Assembly that the killing in the Middle East would end once a “just peace,” based on 
Palestinian rights, hopes, and aspirations, was finally established. “I have come bearing an 
olive branch and a freedom fighter’s glove,” said Arafat. “Do not let the olive branch fall 
from my hand.”1 For many observers, Arafat’s speech has been remembered as the moment 
when the moderates in the PLO took “center stage” as the “heartbeat” of the Palestinian 
movement and Palestinian rights.2  But for others his mere presence in the United Nations 
represented a diplomatic ‘triumph’ of the Palestinians’ revolutionary struggle. Never before 
at the UN, even during Algeria’s long war for independence, had a person been permitted to 
address the full General Assembly who did not represent a government.  Arafat received a 
minute long standing ovation from most delegates in the hall, and was accorded treatment 
at the UN normally reserved for heads of state.  
 
How and why the PLO accomplished this remarkable feat, shedding its image as a pawn of 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab movement to be recognized by many 
around the world as a de facto government and its leader as the official spokesman of the 
stateless Palestinian people, is the subject of Paul Thomas Chamberlin’s impressive new 
book, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
Making of the Post-Cold War Order.  Chamberlin’s study is a demonstration of international 
history at its best. Drawing on documents and archives in Arab states, the United States and 
Great Britain, as well as other Arabic language sources, Chamberlin reframes the traditional 
narrative of the Palestinian liberation struggle of the 1960s and 1970s, which is often 
viewed within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab politics, and instead 
demonstrates that the PLO emerged as a “spiritual successor” (258) to revolutionary 
groups from around the Third World that developed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
  
Just as Jeremi Suri’s Power and Protest found a common “language of dissent” in the social 
and cultural movements of the 1960s that stretched from the streets of Paris and Berlin to 
the Berkeley campus,3 Chamberlin’s The Global Offensive similarly concludes that the PLO 
was part of the “global wave” of national liberation movements, which sought to “project 
their armed struggle into an increasingly interconnected world order.” (5, 258) In the wake 
of Israel’s conquest, during the 1967 Six-Day War, of the West Bank and Gaza, which 
contained more than 1.3 million Arabs, Palestinian fighters “seized on the promise of 
liberation through revolution in the Algerian, Cuban, and Vietnamese models” (22). 
Palestinians received training and instruction on guerilla warfare from North Vietnam and 
1 The text of Arafat’s speech to the United Nations is printed in the New York Times, 14 November 1974.  
2 David W. Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 256.  
3 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: The Global Revolutions of 1968 and the Origins of Détente (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003).  
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Algeria, drew military and financial support from the People’s Republic of China, and 
accepted material assistance and moral support from Cuba. (61-65) Intellectuals, 
academics, and writers, also came to their aid, spreading the message that Israel was 
nothing more than an extension of European colonialism, much like the white regime in 
South Africa or French-ruled Algeria. By using this transnational network, and by echoing 
the language of revolutionary politics drawn from a “shared culture of Third World 
national liberation,” (5) argues Chamberlin, the PLO established itself as the “first 
globalized insurgency” (3) and became a “seminal influence” on other rebellions in the 
following decades.  
 
In describing the PLO’s emergence on the international stage, Chamberlin focuses heavily 
on its “diplomatic struggle,” (218) particularly at the United Nations. The “paradigm shift” 
(178) in global politics, which began with the Bandung Conference in 1955, and continued 
throughout the 1960s as countries in Africa and Asia achieved their independence from 
European powers, provided Third World countries with the ‘clout’ to push their agendas at 
the United Nations and other international forums. The UN General Assembly, for example, 
supported resolutions reaffirming “the inalienable right of self-determination and 
independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien 
domination,” protected the rights of “oppressed peoples” fighting for national liberation, 
refused to condemn several acts of international ‘terrorism,’ and prevented U.S. and Israeli 
efforts to criminalize the PLO. (178-179) Beyond the UN, Chamberlin cites the 
establishment of PLO offices in East Berlin and the People’s Republic of China as evidence 
of the PLO’s growing international influence and acceptance.   
 
This is clearly an ambitious project for which Chamberlin deserves significant praise. By 
establishing connections between the PLO and other revolutionary nationalist groups that 
most historians have either previously ignored or failed to recognize, Chamberlin has 
written a true work of transnational history that includes discussion of the United States, 
Palestinians, Israel, Vietnam, China, Algeria, and South Africa. The Global Offensive, then, 
reshapes our understanding of the Palestinian liberation movement in its infancy, drawing 
important links between the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the Vietcong, and Cuban 
nationalists. “Viewed from a distance,” Chamberlin writes, “they appear as an international 
force in their own right, a global offensive against the bastions of state power in the Cold 
War system” (5).   
 
Despite the significant insights Chamberlin adds to the global dimensions of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, and they are many, he often overestimates the PLO’s ability to 
influence regional politics, and has a somewhat flawed interpretation of the Nixon 
administration’s policy in the Middle East. With regards to the Palestinians, Chamberlin 
leaves the impression that because the PLO received increasing international support after 
the Six-Day War, particularly among Third World nations, and drew attention to its cause 
by highly dramatic events, including the hijacking of civilian airlines and the assassination 
of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic games, that this somehow translated 
into the PLO’s ability to achieve its stated goal of the establishment of a sovereign 
Palestinian state. It did not. In fact, at no time between 1967 and 1975, the period covered 
in this book, was the PLO remotely close to establishing a Palestinian state either through 
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political or military efforts. Arafat may have been applauded inside the halls of the United 
Nations General Assembly, but he was treated largely as an afterthought when it came to 
Arab-Israeli negotiations.   
 
The PLO’s inability to leverage its increased international clout for concessions toward a 
Palestinians state was clearly seen in aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. More 
than five years after the Battle of Karameh put Arafat and the PLO on the map, and at a time 
when the ‘international community’ clamored for a peace settlement between Arabs and 
Israelis, the PLO was shut out of the post-war negotiations.  At the Geneva peace 
conference, which was organized by the United States but held under UN auspices, the 
Palestinians were relegated to bystanders. Neither the Egyptians nor the Jordanians 
refused to attend the conference because the Palestinians were not invited, and the Soviet 
Union, which had recognized the PLO, did not aggressively push for Palestinian 
involvement at Geneva.  Although Secretary of State Henry Kissinger maintained an open 
dialogue with the PLO through CIA channels,4 he never took the discussions seriously. So 
long as he was in charge of shaping American foreign policy he would not pressure Israel to 
accept the PLO as a negotiating partner. “An Arafat Palestine is impossible for you,” 
Kissinger told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir a week before the Geneva conference. 
“Therefore I’ll never recommend it.”5  
 
Chamberlin acknowledges that the PLO failed to achieve its ultimate objective—the 
establishment of a Palestinian state—but he blames this in large part on US support for 
Israel and Jordan as “regional policemen” (259) and Washington’s failure to bring 
“Palestinian moderates” (128) into discussions for a political solution. And herein lays the 
central weakness of his argument: Chamberlin looks at America’s support for Israel almost 
exclusively from the perspective of the Palestinian issue. In reality, however, U.S. support 
for Israel during the Nixon administration had far more to do with countering Soviet aid to 
Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria. By looking at U.S. support for Israel in regional 
instead of global terms, Chamberlin erroneously concludes that President Richard Nixon 
and Kissinger pursued a strategy of “active disengagement” (85) in the Middle East, blindly 
supported Israel with economic and military aid, ignored the plight of the Palestinians, and 
chose to “marginalize” Middle East experts in the administration who advocated a more 
balanced policy in the region vis-à-vis Israel and the Arabs. “Put simply,” says Chamberlin, 
“Nixon and Kissinger did not understand the dynamics in the Middle East and had little use for 
anyone who did.” (106; my emphasis) 
 
Nixon and Kissinger certainly viewed the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict in global 
strategic terms. But the notion that they did not understand the Middle East because they 
sought a strategic partnership with Israel and Jordan at the expense of the Palestinians 
completely misses the point.  What mattered to Nixon and Kissinger was bringing stability 
4 See Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. XXV, Doc. 318; Henry Kissinger, Years 
of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982), 629.   
5 Kissinger-Meir Memcon, 16 December 1973, FRUS, 1969-1963, Vol. XXV, Doc. 398.  
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to the Middle East so they could pursue their larger foreign policy objectives, namely 
détente with the Soviet Union.  They feared that if another war erupted between the Arabs 
and the Israelis, the superpowers would be drawn into the conflict and the prospects for 
détente would go out the window.  In the first three years of his administration, Nixon 
sought this stability not through “standstill diplomacy,” as Chamberlin suggests,6 but by 
actively working for a peace agreement in the Middle East with the Soviets, Arabs, and 
Israelis. Only after these efforts failed in August 1971, and détente became more of a 
reality, did Nixon turn to a policy of “active disengagement,” by supporting Israel and 
Jordan and refusing to seriously help the Arabs get their land back. But this was not for any 
lack of understanding of the region.  
 
Moreover, Nixon was not as blindly supportive of Israel as Chamberlin suggests. Although 
he would not abandon Israel as an ally, he felt that it was clearly in America’s interest to 
‘halt’ the Soviet domination of the Arab Middle East by broadening U.S. relations with the 
Arab countries. “Where on the analysis the question becomes primarily one of the interests 
of Israel and the interests of Israel’s neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, et al, then we should have a 
totally even-handed policy,” Nixon told Secretary of State William Rogers.”7 As part of his 
even-handed policy, Nixon called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, 
fought aggressively to improve relations with Egypt and, at times, refused to provide Israel 
additional arms shipments until its leaders were more cooperative in negotiations with the 
Arabs. In February 1973, after Israel mistakenly shot down a civilian Libyan passenger jet 
that had strayed over the Sinai Peninsula, killing seventy passengers aboard and wounding 
another thirteen, Nixon demanded that Israel compensate the victims of the attack, and 
made it clear to Kissinger that “the time has come to quit pandering to Israel’s intransigent 
position. Our actions over the past have led them to think we will stand with them 
regardless of how unreasonable they are.”8 
 
Part of the reason that Chamberlin draws these conclusions is that he mistakenly sees the 
Jordan Crisis of 1970 as the “turning point” (108) for U.S. policy in the region.  “By backing 
King Hussein’s crackdown on the Palestinians,” Chamberlin concludes, “Washington 
effectively underwrote what came to be seen as one of the most brutal expressions of state 
reaction in the Arab world.” (124) True, the White House clearly supported Hussein’s 
6 This argument was first put forth by William B. Quandt in 1977.  See Quandt, Decades of Decision: 
American Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 
In the revised edition of this study, updated to include discussion of the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton 
administrations, Quandt changed the name of this chapter from “Standstill Diplomacy” to “Kissinger’s 
Diplomacy: Stalemate and War, 1972–73.” See William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy in the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 98–129. For a more recent 
interpretation of the stalemate during this period, see Salim Yaqub, “The Politics of Stalemate: The Nixon 
Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973,” in Nigel J. Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle 
East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967–1973 (London: Routledge, 2007), 35–58. 
7 Nixon to Rogers, 26 May 1971, National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers, Box 25.  
8 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 212.  
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efforts to remove the Palestinian fighters from his land. But what options did the U.S. have? 
To support the Palestinians, who had only weeks before attempted to assassinate King 
Hussein, hijacked four civilian airliners, and held Americans hostage? Just as Chamberlin 
rightly concludes that the Palestinians drew lessons from the North Vietnamese, U.S. 
officials understood that the South Vietnamese government would closely monitor 
Washington’s response to the Jordan crisis. Abandoning an American ally (Jordan) to 
guerilla fighters who drew inspiration and military support from Hanoi, was simply not the 
message the White House wanted to send to the leadership in Saigon—or any of its allies 
around the world.  
 
Moreover, the Jordan crisis was not a “turning point” in America’s support for Israel, as 
Chamberlin suggests. In fact, in the months immediately following the Jordan Crisis, the 
Nixon administration aggressively pursued improved relations with the Arabs by reaching 
out to Egypt’s new President, Anwar Sadat. Nixon sent Secretary of State William Rogers to 
Cairo in May 1971 and cut off arms shipments to Israel in June. The turning point in the 
Nixon administration’s policy in the region (if there was one) was not the Jordan Crisis, but 
rather the agreements on the Middle East reached between the United States and the Soviet 
Union at the May 1972 Moscow Summit. Once the superpowers agreed to the “no war, no 
peace” situation in the Middle East, and accepted the status quo in the region, it was 
imperative that the Arabs not be in a position to start a war that would adversely impact 
détente. To do so meant strengthening Israel at the expense of the Arabs, and increasing its 
support for King Hussein who, the White House hoped, would refuse to join the Arabs in 
any future war.  
 
Outside of my differences with Chamberlin’s treatment of the Nixon administration’s 
Middle East policy, however, The Global Offensive is an impressive work of international 
history and should be considered a must-read for anyone who is interested in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, U.S. foreign policy, Middle East area studies, and the tangled personal and 
policy dynamics of the Nixon White House. The book provides needed agency to the 
Palestinian liberation struggle that is often overlooked by scholarship (including my own) 
covering the interwar years (1967-1973). It offers students of the Arab-Israeli conflict a 
more nuanced view of the Palestinian movement. And it sheds much-needed light on the 
unique parallels among the PLO and other revolutionary national groups, including the 
FLN, the Vietcong, and Cuban nationalists  
 
In sum, The Global Offensive will change the way historians and political scientists view the 
Palestinian movement and should spawn a wave of new studies that show how these 
international influences shaped the PLO from the mid-1970s to the present. 
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Review by William B. Quandt, University of Virginia 
 
The PLO in its International Setting 
 
aul Thomas Chamberlain’s The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order makes a 
determined effort to look at the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) through a 
lens that privileges its similarities to other national liberation movements, in particular 
those in Cuba, Vietnam and Algeria, and does not simply dwell on its hostility to Israel and 
its resort to terror.  This perspective is a welcome departure, but the book sometimes 
seems to get caught up in a degree of romantic revolutionary zeal, before coming to a 
rather sobering conclusion that the PLO has largely failed in its goals. 
 
Yasir Arafat and the PLO are introduced as having seized the “transnational space” that 
crisscrossed the globe in the 1960s “using a revolutionary set of tactics and strategies 
never before seen in history” (3). The United States, especially during the Presidency of 
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s stint as National SecurityAdviser, predictably 
responded to the PLO with hostility: “Ultimately, as the two sides fought over the physical 
and conceptual space that was Palestine, they helped to remake the art of revolution and 
the structure of global power in the late Cold War world and beyond” (3). In short, the 
author stakes out some very big claims at the outset. 
 
Chapter two makes the case for the centrality of the 1968 battle of al-Karama in propelling 
Arafat and his Fatah movement to the forefront of the Palestinian struggle. This is pretty 
close to the conventional view, although it became difficult for Fatah to replicate the 
‘success’ of that battle. The PLO as an umbrella movement of numerous Palestinian 
factions, could not settle on a military-diplomatic strategy that related achievable goals to 
the constrained means available to the Palestinians. 
 
Chapters three and four concentrate on the Nixon-Kissinger view of the Palestinians and 
the Jordan civil war of 1970-71, making good use of the recently declassified materials 
from this period in the U.S. archives. Chapter five focuses on the turn of some Palestinian 
groups toward international acts of terrorism – the Munich summer games in 1972 and the 
killing of the American Ambassador Cleo Noel and two others in Khartoum in March 1973, 
both acts attributed to the shadowy Black September Organization (BSO).  Chamberlain 
believes that Arafat was not responsible for the actions of the BSO, a point to which we will 
return later.  
 
Chapters six and seven deal with the turn by the mainstream of the PLO to diplomacy in the 
mid-1970s, including the onset of tentative direct contacts between Fatah and the United 
States. The author concludes with a brief, rather critical account of the weaknesses that led 
the PLO to what he earlier described as a “great stalemate” (6), but now calls a “great 
defeat” (259). In two brief concluding pages (266-267), the author blames the PLO for not 
making a clear statement about its willingness to accept Israel within pre-1967 borders; 
notes Arafat’s failure to unify the guerrilla movement and develop a clear strategy for 
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armed struggle; and criticizes both Israel and the PLO for seeking military solutions to 
problems that were primarily diplomatic and political. These are all important 
observations, but deserved deeper treatment earlier in the text. 
 
Chamberlain has tried to write an international history of the PLO that takes note of the 
context in which the movement emerged and the widespread contacts that it cultivated as 
it became an actor on the international scene. This worthy ambition comes at a price. By 
trying to paint on such a wide canvas, as international historians are bound to do, the 
author sometimes shortchanges important aspects of the story.  Chapter six is intent on 
developing the idea of  that ‘the torch’ of revolution against the U.S.-led world order was 
being passed from Vietnam to the PLO, but the argument does not really hold up very well.  
In part this was due to the divided nature of the PLO itself. 
 
I think that the author should have spent more time on internal developments within the 
PLO and Arafat’s inability to forge a degree of real unity. The other national movements 
that Chamberlain compares the PLO to – in Cuba, Vietnam, and Algeria, home of the 
Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) – were all much more centralized and, as a 
result, had more coherent policies.  An important reason for the fragmentation of the PLO 
was the dispersal of the Palestinian population and the PLO’s heavy dependence on various 
Arab states for diplomatic support, arms, and financing, each of which had its own 
objectives. Arafat struggled not to become a captive of any single state, but he was 
constantly making tactical compromises to win support from one or another of them.  
Arafat and his inner circle would have been the first to insist on the importance of this 
issue. The author should have given much more attention to this structural dilemma faced 
by the Palestinian leadership since it helps to explain the lack of coherent strategy on the 
part of the PLO at crucial moments. 
 
I am reluctant to support Chamberlain’s willingness to believe that Arafat did not have 
much, if anything, to do with the Blank September Organization (192). Arafat was a master 
of manipulation and sometimes of illusion. Ali Hassan Salameh, the head of Arafat’s 
intelligence organization, was one of those who set up Black September and planned the 
Munich attacks. I find it is inconceivable that Arafat knew nothing about what his aide was 
doing. Chamberlain quotes a few second-hand sources to the effect that Arafat had nothing 
to do with the killing of Ambassador Noel and his two colleagues in Khartoum, but he 
makes no mention of contradictory information. Specifically, he does not refer to the book 
by David Korn on the subject, or the near-contemporary article by David Ottaway in the 
Washington Post, April 5, 1975, which indicates that U.S. sources were privy to information 
that Arafat personally gave the order for the assassination.1 
 
Finally, there is a largely untold story of contacts between the United States and the PLO.  
Chamberlain alludes to the existence of an intelligence link, but views it as unrelated to 
diplomacy. He briefly notes a meeting between the Deputy Head of the Central Intelligence 
1 David A. Korn, Assassination in Khartoum (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1993}; David B. 
Ottaway, “Arafat Implicated in Envoy’s Death”, Washington Post, April 5, 1973. 
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Agency (CIA), Vernon Walters, and the Fatah leader Khalid al-Hassan, in Morocco in 
November 1974, but that is about as far as he goes. He makes no use of the declassified 
actual record of Walters’s meeting with al-Hassan.2 In addition to this channel, the CIA had 
a very important liaison relationship with Arafat’s intelligence man, Ali Hassan Salameh, in 
Beirut during much of the mid- to late-1970s. A very significant flow of intelligence came 
through that channel, and it was also used to send sensitive diplomatic messages on 
occasion. Robert Ames, the CIA officer who oversaw this relationship for many years, 
played a larger than heretofore reported role in U.S. policy. I understand that a book is in 
the works about him and that may help to fill this gap in the story of the U.S.-PLO 
relationship. Suffice it to say that it was considerably more complex than is portrayed in 
Chamberlain’s account. 
 
To his credit, Chamberlain does make good use of some Arabic sources. But the PLO has not 
opened its archives, so much of the publicly available information comes from public 
statements or news reports. There are still a few – very few – of Arafat’s inner circle alive 
today and they could be interviewed to see if additional information on key episodes could 
be provided. Unfortunately, Chamberlain did not include any references to interviews for 
this work. As a result, the quite rich documentation on the American side of the U.S.-PLO 
relationship is not matched by anything comparable on the Palestinian side. We end up 
with a somewhat one dimensional view of heroic Palestinians struggling against 
overwhelming odds to carry forward the ‘global offensive’ against a world order that was 
stacked overwhelmingly against them. 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, 
(Washington D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), 882-886. 
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Review by Brad Simpson, University of Connecticut 
 
The PLO and the Global Circuits of Revolution 
 
n July 23, 1968 commandos from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) hijacked an Israeli passenger jet bound for Tel Aviv, diverting it to Algiers. 
This simple but revolutionary act was packed with meaning: for the Algerian 
government, which was forced to take a position on the legitimacy of the PFLP’s actions by 
deciding whether or not to accept the plane; for the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), PFLP’s main rival in the Palestinian national struggle, whose tactics were radicalized 
in turn; and for the Israeli and U.S. governments, forced to respond to a stateless movement 
operating across borders and seeking control of no territory. Perhaps most significantly, as 
Paul Chamberlin suggests in this revealing and important book, the PFLP blazed a trail 
“quite literally in the space between nations” (72), helping to force global debates on the 
meaning of terrorism and the legitimacy of armed struggle which are still with us. 
 
Chamberlin’s most innovative move is simply to insist that we view the PLO as part of a 
larger landscape of third-world revolutionaries and the global radical left, of which it 
viewed itself a part, and not merely as a subset of the Arab-Israeli struggle or the history of 
Arab nationalism and decolonization (18-28).  Palestinian activists, he shows, were self-
consciously cosmopolitan.  They identified with revolutionary movements of varying 
ideological stripes around the world, studied and adopted the tactics of guerrillas from 
China, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, and elsewhere, and mobilized state and non-state supporters 
in international forums and the global media.  They were, in short, rebelling “against the 
imagined geography of the Cold War order,” and, one might add, the imagination of many 
historians who write about it (21). 
 
This was a strategy born of necessity as well as vision.  Both Yasir Arafat and George 
Hasbah were children of the golden age of Arab Nationalism.  Born in the 1920s, they 
participated in the war of 1948 and were attracted to Nasser’s vision of Pan-Arabism in the 
1950s. But by the time Arab states founded the PLO in 1964, hoping to keep the Palestinian 
nationalist movement under control, both Arafat and Hasbah had embraced more radical 
visions, a move seemingly vindicated by the Arab states’ crushing defeat in the 1967 War 
(and which led Hasbah shortly after to found PFLP).   
 
For Palestinian radicals of the late 1960s, alternative sources of both aid and inspiration 
abounded, both near (Algiers) and far (Havana, Hanoi and Beijing).  The Fedayeen’s 
emergence in 1968 as a potent symbol of armed resistance to Israel, operating from Jordan 
and aided by China (50), suggests that they had already begun to globalize their conception 
of national liberation.  U.S. officials, Chamberlin makes clear, had trouble even 
conceptualizing what the PLO sought to do, and initially insisted on analyzing Fatah and the 
PFLP solely through the lens of terrorism (47-49).  The emergence of the PLO and PFLP as 
globally significant actors coincided both with a proliferation of transnational circuits for 
building and spreading ties of solidarity, and with a series of perceived crises in 
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international politics which suggested the limited ability of either superpower to control 
the direction of revolutionary movements in the decolonizing world. 
 
‘Fellow’ Arab governments were ambivalent about the PLO.  They were indispensable to 
the success of the Palestinian national struggle and offered the PLO material and 
ideological support, viewing it, as one Egyptian official put it, as the “irresponsible arm” of 
established Arab states.  But these same states, particularly Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, 
also viewed the PLO and PFLP as a burden and threat.  Fedayeen operations called forth 
disproportionate Israeli retaliation against their perceived hosts and highlighted their 
conservatism and military impotence in the face of Palestinian boldness (196-198).  
  
Like Nasser, U.S. officials such as Secretary of State William Rogers thought they could 
effectively negotiate over the heads of Palestinian activists, or simply ignore them entirely 
and deal directly with the states presumed to be the true arbiters of Palestinian futures 
(107-110).  Yet growing international recognition of the PLO as the legitimate embodiment 
of Palestinian nationalism made it and the PFLP forces to be reckoned with.  Their rejection 
of the Roger’s Plan in 1970 and resort to ever more daring symbolic actions led directly to 
civil war in Jordan in September.  Though the Jordanian government’s brutal response 
“represented a humanitarian and military disaster for the PLO, it functioned as something 
of a political victory in the international community,” much as the Front de Libération 
Nationale’s (FLN) military defeats in Algeria and the National Liberation Front’s (NLF) 
failures in the 1968 Tet offensive (129).   
 
Nowhere was this disruptive potential more evident than in the PLO’s ‘external operations.’ 
Plane hijackings, attacks on Israel civilian and military targets in other countries, and the 
participation in these of foreign fighters from a wide range of countries, each posed novel 
questions about how to assess responsibility for acts of transnational terrorism, who, if 
anyone to punish, and how international law could effectively respond to them (100-107). 
Chamberlin provides the best discussion yet in print of how the emergence of 
‘transnational terrorism’ as a geopolitical problem posed challenges not easily reducible to 
Cold War concerns.   As he notes, attacks on civil aviation by Fedayeen fighters demanded a 
global response, yet the U.S. decision to frame the issue almost wholly on Israeli terms, 
while endorsing Tel Aviv’s policy of punitive attacks on states supporting the PLO (and 
assassinations of PLO activists in third countries) rendered the task of achieving 
international consensus on the matter almost impossible.   
 
A succession of disputes at the United Nations provoked in part by these operations reveals 
a terrain of debate over the meaning of terrorism that is almost wholly alien to Western 
sensibilities.  The practical question was whether the United Nations could or would 
acknowledge that peoples living under colonial domination had the right to use any means 
at their disposal - including armed struggle or acts designated as terrorism - to achieve it.  
The UN Decolonization Committee (Committee of 24), increasingly dominated, in Western 
eyes, by newly-independent Asian and African states and the Soviet Union, suggested that 
the answer was yes.  The Committee passed similar resolutions urging UN member states 
to extend recognition to Amilcar Cabral’s African Party for the Independence of Guinea-
Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the 
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Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the African National Congress (ANC) in South 
Africa, and other armed liberation movements. 
 
Disputes over the right of liberation movements to employ armed struggle to achieve self-
determination surfaced repeatedly within the Human Rights Commission and even the UN 
Committee on Terrorism.  Discussion of a 1973 resolution which would have marked one of 
the first definitive UN statements on terrorism stalled over an inability to bridge the gap 
“on the relationship between action on international terrorism and [the] struggle for self-
determination.” Most Afro-Asian and socialist members insisted that “violations by states 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms” lay at the root of terrorism (178-183). 
 
The PLO’s expulsion from Jordan in 1970 and its subsequent establishment of sanctuaries 
in Lebanon, Chamberlin argues, marked a turning point in the “globalization of the 
Palestinian armed struggle” (149).  For the next few years, radical factions of the Fedayeen 
such as the Black September movement turned increasingly to ‘external operations’ 
including airline hijackings, attacks on civilians in airports in Israel and Europe, the 
assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo in November 1971, and the 
infamous murder of Israeli athletes at the summer Olympics in Munich the following year.  
The participation of Maoist Japanese Red Army faction members, among others, in some of 
these attacks illustrated both the global appeal of PLO and PFLP terrorist operations and 
the ties binding Palestinian militants to tactical and ideological brethren around the world 
(154).   
 
The increasing reliance on external operations widened a split within the PLO itself, with 
moderates (led by Arafat) seeking to distance themselves from groups like Black 
September, whose actions hurt the organization’s efforts to gain diplomatic recognition as 
the sole legitimate representative of Palestinian nationalism. Because it controlled no 
territory, the PLO relied on the force of global public opinion much more than previous 
armed struggle movements, which, according to Chamberlin, often pulled it in opposite 
directions.  Moderate Palestinian leaders sought to signal to the U.S. and other powerful 
Western governments that the PLO could engage in responsible diplomacy.  At the United 
Nations, however, many socialist and Nonaligned Movement members viewed Fedayeen 
tactics as a legitimate response to Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.  This hostile 
climate prompted both U.S. and Israeli officials to abandon the world body as a 
constructive venue for building a political consensus against terrorism, and to turn to 
‘counter-terrorism’ as a more effective strategy, a shift with important long-term 
implications for both Israeli and U.S. foreign policy (206-217).   
 
The political and military fallout from the Black September operations and the 1973 Yom 
Kippur war, prompted Arafat, with uneven success, to seek greater control over Palestinian 
radicals. The PLO leadership also began to display a growing moderation, abandoning calls 
for Israel’s destruction, shifting its focus to a diplomatic track and demanding statehood as 
a framework for realization of Palestinian goals of self-determination. Chamberlin argues, 
however,  that just as Palestinian leaders sought to shift their global offensive into a 
diplomatic phase, U.S. and Israeli leaders “moved to lock the Palestinians out of the formal 
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peace process,” insisting on negotiations through Jordan and Egypt alone, and “insuring 
that violence would continue” (228-230, 246). 
 
Chamberlin’s discussion of President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger’s Middle East diplomacy treads over well-traveled terrain.  But he deftly reveals 
the limitations of their geopolitical worldview for grappling with the non-state diplomacy 
of the PLO, and with the range of transnational forces re-shaping international politics 
more generally.  Like their Israeli counterparts, Nixon and Kissinger regarded the Fedayeen 
“as a military and intelligence problem, rather than as foreign policy issue (93).”  Like 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, they largely failed to recognize that their very 
statelessness rendered the increasingly diasporic Palestinian community a genuinely 
transnational phenomenon (91-93, 218-250), one which required addressing the political 
conditions which fed its global support.   
 
“The Palestinians and PLO simply did not fit into Kissinger’s framework,” he concludes, 
“and its victories, symbolic though they might be, served only to complicate the process 
whereby disillusionment would bring the Arab states into alignment with Washington” 
(227, 240-244). The resulting stalemate, brought about – at least in 1975 – largely by U.S. 
and Israeli intransigence, may have doomed the prospects for a Palestinian state at the very 
moment when a variety of forces where driving it to genuine compromise.  Ironically, the 
PLO’s transnational character, which enabled it to survive Israeli military reprisals, build 
diverse international support, and operate almost anywhere in the world, posed real 
barriers to Palestinian unity and conceptual challenges to the U.S. and other governments 
that were accustomed to dealing with established states and wary of the PLO’s potential for 
disrupting regional stability.   
 
I’ll leave it to others to weigh in on Chamberlin’s contribution to the historiography of 
Palestinian nationalism and the Arab-Israeli struggle, debates in which I am neither 
participant nor partisan. Rather, I would like to offer a few thoughts on what The Global 
Offensive has to say for international historians. These days, everybody’s struggle seems to 
portend the post-Cold War world – Algerian revolutionaries, ANC fighters, human rights 
activists and Palestinian radicals.1 Chamberlin is not making a radically new argument 
here, merely illustrating the obvious point that many phenomena of contemporary 
international politics emerged during, but were not wholly of the Cold War, and long 
outlasted it.  Like Matthew Connelly and Ryan Irwin, he vividly illustrates the inadequacy of 
a Cold-War, and even a strictly regional, framework for apprehending key dynamics of 
decolonization, given the global circuits along which solidarity, economic and military 
assistance to the Palestinians traveled.  He also demonstrates that integrative ‘globalizing’ 
processes and technologies, such as international air travel, banking, and satellite 
communications, simultaneously produced cracks and fissures ripe for exploitation by non-
1 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-
Cold War Era (New York: Oxford, 2003); Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the 
Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford, 2012); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 
(Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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state actors. Transnational violence of the sort symbolized by the PLO and PFLP 
highlighted the inadequacy of a state-centered framework of international law for 
adjudicating ‘terrorist’ acts carried out by a stateless movement, assisted by other radical 
movements, and (at least initially) seeking control of no territory.  The U.S. and Israeli 
response – refusal to acknowledge the PLO, insistence on working through Arab States, and 
resort to a strategy of retaliatory counter-terrorism, similarly exploited this liminal space 
in the fabric of international law and the framework of interstate relations. 
 
Doing this sort of history presents methodological challenges.  Guerrilla movements, with 
few exceptions, leave no archives, and force the historian to recover their voice and agency 
from more traditional sources. 2  Chamberlin expertly plumbs the holdings of the Library of 
the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, published collections of Palestinian documents, 
and a wide range of PLO and Fatah newspapers, but much of the book relies heavily on U.S. 
and British archives.  We hear comparatively little from other Arab governments, especially 
Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, though judicious use of other French and Arabic-language 
newspapers could have given a much better sense of the ways in which the Palestinian 
national struggle inflected public and official discourse in Arab countries.  We also see 
relatively little of the debate at the United Nations, though some of the relevant UN 
archives in New York are open and easily accessed. 
 
These are minor quibbles, however, for one of the most important books on decolonization 
and international relations in recent years.  Paul Chamberlin has given us a new way of 
seeing a seemingly familiar story, and a salutary model of international history. 
 
2 For an important exception, see the forthcoming PhD dissertation by Andrea Onate-Madrazo, Insurgent 
Diplomacy: El Salvador’s Revolution and the End of the Cold War, 1976-1992 (Princeton), which relies on 
thousands of pages of documents of the hitherto unknown archives of one of the main FMLN factions. 
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Author’s Response by Paul Chamberlin, University of Kentucky 
 
 would like begin by thanking the tireless editors of H-Diplo for devoting this 
roundtable to my book. I consider it quite an honor to be put through the ringer by four 
such fine scholars as Jeffrey Byrne, Craig Daigle, William Quandt, and Brad Simpson. 
Although I am not so naïve as to think that a book about the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) would please all readers – indeed it seems, not surprisingly, to have 
ruffled some feathers outside of academia – I am deeply flattered by these four reviews.  
 
The Global Offensive represents an effort to explain the history of the clash between the PLO 
and the United States in its international setting. It is an attempt to map the transnational 
dimensions of the Palestinian revolution by locating the PLO’s story on the global 
landscape of Third World national liberation struggles and highlighting its strikingly 
cosmopolitan dimensions. At the same time, it seeks to trace out the largely untold story of 
the U.S. government’s attempts to crush this militant new strain of Palestinian nationalism 
by working with its allies in the region – Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon – to mount a 
counterinsurgency against the PLO. Lastly, it demonstrates the enduring impact of this 
conflict on the international order. In this way, it was my hope that the book would 
contribute to a number of overlapping fields: international history, U.S. foreign policy, and 
Middle East studies. The four reviews, while not universally laudatory, encourage me to 
believe that I have done so.  
 
I am gratified to see from this roundtable that my book has found its most sympathetic 
audience among my fellow international historians. My primary goals, as Jeffrey Byrne 
notes, were to use the PLO’s story “as a window into” the larger phenomenon of Third 
World national liberation movements in the post-1945 era and to place the Palestinian 
story alongside that of the Chinese, Algerians, Vietnamese, and Cubans. I have for some 
time been dismayed at the tendency of those both inside and outside of academia to treat 
the history of the Middle East and its peoples as somehow separate from the rest of the 
world. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in discussions of the Arab-Israeli dispute – 
particularly those that treat it as an ‘age-old’ clash between religions, etc. Most readers will 
know that the conflict is in fact a contemporary one rooted in the challenges of nationalism 
and decolonization.  
 
In this vein, it was my hope with The Global Offensive to cast the rise of the PLO not simply 
as a subchapter in the Arab-Israeli conflict but rather as part of a global wave of national 
liberation movements that swept through the postcolonial world in the decades following 
1945. The Palestinian guerrillas were part of a revolutionary lineage that ran from Mao 
Zedong, through Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, and the Algerian FLN. As contemporary 
observers put it, Yasir Arafat was the ‘Arab Ché Guevara.’ More than this, as Byrne 
observes, I argue that the PLO appeared at a critical juncture in which this Third Worldist 
movement began to split apart. The PLO and the tactics it introduced thus represented a 
sort of bridge between the secular national liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s 
and contemporary resistance movements like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. My goal 
is not to lump secular groups like the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) or the 
I 
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PLO together with Islamist groups like Hamas – they are drastically different –, but they are 
part of a larger revolutionary line. Byrne also picks up on a second major theme of my 
work, which makes the case for understanding the Nixon Doctrine’s regional-policeman 
approach as a new strategy for fighting revolutionary nationalism in the developing world. 
The disaster in Vietnam may have discouraged Washington from staging full-scale military 
interventions in the Cold War periphery, but the Third World remained an important 
battleground. President Richard Nixon’s approach allowed the United States to continue its 
war against groups such as the PLO, holding the line on battlefields around the Global 
South, without sacrificing large numbers of American lives. 
 
Byrne – whose work focuses on the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) – makes 
three excellent points on postcolonial revolution that I would like to address. The first 
concerns the failure of the Palestinian leadership to create a united front. This is an issue 
that I address at length in the book as one of the central flaws of the post-1967 Palestinian 
armed struggle. Indeed, I think it is possible to attribute many, if not most, of the PLO’s 
greatest failures to Arafat’s decision not to consolidate his control over the movement. 
Byrne’s second point focuses on the PLO’s decision to agree to the peace process before it 
had achieved its major goals. On this point I would refer to the PLO’s second cardinal 
failure – its inability either to devise the means to achieve its goals or to adjust its goals to 
fit its means. As I explain in my book, “The PLO’s guerilla tactics—both conventional and 
external—were never sufficient to match the strategic goals of the movement” (266). There 
was never any way that the PLO could achieve its objective of creating a state in all of 
Palestine using the resources at its disposal. Its best bet, I argue, was to press for the 
creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the negotiating table. 
However, for a number of reasons – including its failure to create a united front – the PLO 
did not issue an explicit statement of this position and Palestinian leaders did not make 
such a state the focus of PLO strategy. This would have amounted to adjusting its goals to 
fit its means.  
 
The other option, which Byrne alludes to, was for the PLO to adjust its means. In practice, 
this would have meant escalating its armed struggle from a campaign of sporadic guerrilla 
attacks and dramatic international operations to a full-scale war of liberation on the 
Algerian or Vietnamese model. The effect would have been exceptionally bloody, sending 
the death toll from the hundreds into the hundreds of thousands. Most of those killed 
would of course have been Palestinians. Whether such a horrific conflict would have 
convinced the leaders of Israel to liquidate their control of the area is, I think, doubtful. This 
leads to Byrne’s third point, where he disagrees with my statement that the PLO’s conflict 
was not “not an immediate consequence of imperial collapse” and thus “retained a certain 
moral ambiguity.” Unlike the FLN or the Viet Minh, the PLO was not fighting against a 
European empire. Israel saw itself as a postcolonial state and the product of a national 
liberation struggle. This made the prospect of a PLO victory all the more implausible and 
the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians all the more ambiguous – to which 
postcolonial nation did the world owe its sympathies? This is not to cast doubt on the 
innate validity of Palestinian nationalism, but rather to shine a light on the virtually 
unmatched determination of Israeli citizens to hold onto their state. 
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Like Byrne, Brad Simpson appreciates my book for what I intended it to be: a contribution 
to the international history of the post-1945 period that situates the PLO in an 
international context. Simpson is most interested in my discussion of transnational 
dimensions of the Palestinian struggle. Prevented from operating as a guerrilla force inside 
the Occupied Territories, Palestinian cadres infiltrated the transnational spaces provided 
by expanding networks of transportation and communication in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Palestinian fighters gained notoriety for their attacks on commercial airlines, 
transportation infrastructure, diplomatic missions, and, perhaps most infamously, the 1972 
killing of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich. While status quo powers such as the United 
States and Israel denounced such attacks as acts of terrorism, the PLO’s supporters around 
the postcolonial world saw such operations as the desperate acts of a people struggling for 
national liberation.  
 
This terrorism-versus-national liberation debate showcased the increasing divide between 
the U.S. government and many postcolonial states, particularly when the Palestinian 
question came up at the United Nations. As Simpson notes,  
 
the emergence of ‘transnational terrorism’ as a geopolitical problem posed challenges 
not easily reducible to Cold War concerns   … attacks on civil aviation by Fedayeen 
fighters demanded a global response, yet the U.S. decision to frame the issue almost 
wholly on Israeli terms, while endorsing Tel Aviv’s policy of punitive attacks on states 
supporting the PLO (and assassinations of PLO activists in third countries) rendered the 
task of achieving international consensus on the matter almost impossible. 
 
U.S. and Israeli efforts to treat the PLO and the Palestinian nationalism that it represented 
as a security threat, rather than a political and diplomatic challenge that must ultimately be 
accommodated, only served to exacerbate the violence. 
 
Thus, by the end of 1974, the PLO had succeeded in staking its claims to be the legitimate 
voice of the Palestinian people in world affairs and ensuring that it would remain a fixture 
on the regional and international stages. As Simpson observes, however, the PLO’s success 
remained incomplete. Arafat and his comrades would not succeed in establishing a state 
and would, in subsequent years, be drawn into the carnage of the Lebanese Civil War and, 
later still, an ongoing conflict with Hamas. Lastly, in answer to his suggestions that I might 
have devoted more space to UN documents and Arab state newspapers, I would first point 
to the sizeable number of UN materials that do appear in my endnotes and second, explain 
that these Arab newspapers articles – and I have looked at a great many of them in the 
course of my research – are not nearly so enlightening, in regard to the PLO, as one might 
hope.  
 
I am quite flattered by Craig Daigle’s praise for my book as “a true work of transnational 
history” and “a demonstration of international history at its best.” If he is correct in this 
assessment, then I have achieved much of what I set out the do by rendering the PLO’s 
story in its wider, global context. In light of his enthusiasm for my central arguments, I was 
surprised by his decision to devote the majority of his review to arguing with some of the 
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less central points of my book. But in the spirit of collegial scholarly debate, I will offer a 
defense of my positions. 
 
I believe that many of Daigle’s disagreements with my interpretation can be traced back to 
the relative importance that we place on the influence of the United States in the Middle 
East. Daigle’s review suggests that his principal metric for assessing the regional impact of 
a group such as the PLO is Washington’s reaction to that group’s policies. In other words, if 
the PLO failed to effect change in U.S. policy, the PLO must not have been terribly 
influential. This essentially Americentric approach makes a great deal of sense if our main 
priority is to understand U.S. foreign policy; it makes less sense, however, if our focus is on 
understanding the regional and international context. It seems clear to me that the Cold-
War era was riddled with significant events to which neither superpower devoted much 
attention. As an international historian, I believe that I would be remiss in using 
superpower interest as my principal metric for determining whether or not a historical 
movement was significant. 
 
Certainly the rise of the PLO falls into this category. Moscow wanted little to do with the 
organization prior to 1972 and Washington did its best to pretend that Arafat and his 
comrades would disappear if they were just ignored for long enough. In spite of this 
ambivalence from the superpowers, the PLO rose from a position of near anonymity to 
international prominence while, at the same time, taking center stage in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute where it still remains. Indeed, the fact that it managed to accomplish these feats in 
the face of staunch U.S. opposition, not to mention crushing defeats on the battlefield, is a 
testament to its ability to influence regional and international politics. Thus, contrary to 
Daigle’s contention, the PLO’s global offensive did indeed move the Palestinians closer to 
their goal of establishing a state. If and when a sovereign Palestinian state finally comes 
into being, Arafat and his comrades will be remembered for their central role in starting 
the process that led to its creation. Take as another example Daigle’s contention that 
September 1970 was not a turning point because U.S. policymakers did not recognize it as 
such. In the space of three weeks, Jamal abd al-Nasir died and Anwar al-Sadat took control 
in Egypt, Hafiz al-Assad came to power in Syria, King Hussein’s troops slaughtered 
thousands of people driving a permanent wedge between Amman and the Palestinian 
leadership, and the PLO was pushed into Lebanon, setting the stage for the disastrous 
fifteen-year civil war in that country. Furthermore, each of these events had a significant 
impact on the U.S. position in the Middle East and its relations with Israel – as did Israel’s 
willingness to support U.S. interests in the war between King Hussein and the Palestinians. 
Whether or not U.S. policymakers realized it at the time, this was indeed a critical turning 
point in the region and for their role in it. 
 
This question of perspective also appears in Daigle’s quibbles with my argument that Nixon 
and Kissinger failed to understand the regional dynamics in the Middle East. Here is the 
record, as I see it: 
 
The two men believed that Israel could function as a strategic asset in the region – 
correct up to a point, I believe, but debated by many. 
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The two believed that by stonewalling the progressive Arab states they could lure them 
away from the USSR – correct on Egypt, wrong on Syria.  
The two feared that the PLO was a Soviet proxy – wrong.  
The administration feared that the PLO might topple the regime in Jordan – wrong.  
The administration doubted that Sadat would hold onto power in Cairo – wrong.  
The two men believed that the PLO was not representative of wider Palestinian 
sentiment – wrong.  
The administration hoped that Jordan could act as the international representative of 
the PLO – wrong.  
The administration believed that the regime in Beirut could crush the PLO just as the 
regime in Amman had done – wrong.  
The administration hoped that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict might be found that 
did not include the PLO – wrong.  
 
Indeed, even if we accept Daigle’s debatable contention that the administration’s primary 
concern was to create stability in the Middle East so that Washington could pursue détente 
with the Soviet Union, we see deep deficiencies as evidenced by the outbreak of the 
October 1973 war. Nixon and Kissinger did not believe that the Arab states would start a 
war with Israel in 1973 – they were, again, disastrously wrong. Thus, even if this was their 
policy, they did not do a fantastic job of carrying it out. Ultimately, I do not think it is too 
much to say that this pattern represents a failure to grasp much of what was taking place in 
the region. 
 
Likewise, I have doubts about Daigle’s characterization of Nixon’s approach to the Arab-
Israeli conflict as “even-handed.”  Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinians all recognized that 
Washington was essentially an adversary in the international arena – albeit one that that 
held tantalizing carrots at the negotiating table. Even the U.S. allies in the region, Lebanon 
and Jordan, complained constantly that they were treated as second fiddles to Israel. The 
best that can be said is that Nixon’s even-handedness is faintly discernible only when we 
restrict our field of vision to other U.S. presidents in the post-1967 period. Moreover, 
Daigle’s statement that I suggest that Nixon was “blindly supportive of Israel” is straw man: 
my book deals numerous times with tensions in the U.S. relationship with Israel. These 
tensions, however, never approached the level of animosity that existed in the U.S. 
relationship with the PLO, Syrians, or Egyptians.  
 
Similarly, Daigle’s argument that Nixon “actively pursued peace in the Middle East” clashes 
with the administration’s actual record. Rather than pursuing peace, Nixon and Kissinger 
chose to increase arms shipments to Israel, play the role of obstructionist at the United 
Nations, torpedoed the efforts of Secretary of State William Rogers to implement the 
Rogers Plan, and give the United States almost sole control over the post-1973 peace 
process. Moreover, Kissinger and Nixon both boasted about the wisdom of this approach in 
their memoirs. Did the principals express some doubt about these policies in classified 
memos? Yes. Did they nevertheless choose to pursue these policies? Yes. What Nixon and 
Kissinger called peace was in fact Israeli regional military supremacy – within certain 
bounds – and a perpetual state of war with the Syria and the Palestinians. In the end, what 
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Nixon and Kissinger wanted in the Middle East was not peace but hegemony for the United 
States. 
 
Again, I believe that the central issue is context. If we privilege the perspective of the 
superpowers, in this case the United States, the PLO was not so terribly important, Nixon 
was arguably wise and even-handed, 1970 was not a critical juncture, and peace equaled 
security for Israel and American hegemony in the region. However, if we view these same 
events in an international context, the PLO’s case was a cause célèbre that sat at the very 
heart of the regional conflict, Nixon was a resolute defender of Israel (among many other 
less savory things), 1970 was a watershed year in the Middle East, Washington’s definition 
of stability meant Pax Americana, and peace equaled a comprehensive settlement to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict that did not materialize. Rather than belabor the point any further, I 
will leave it to the reader to decide which version of events they find more persuasive. 
 
Turning last to William Quandt’s review, I am not entirely surprised that my book has 
drawn both criticism and praise from those in the always-contentious field of Middle East 
Studies.1 As many of my fellow international historians have found, our area studies 
colleagues can be a tough audience, although I believe it is critical to pursue a dialogue with 
them. Quandt praises my book for its intended purpose of situating the PLO in a global 
context but laments the fact that I did not write a more comprehensive study of the 
organization’s internal politics and that I did not more fully explore the intelligence 
connections between the CIA and the PLO. In my defense, that is not the book that I set out 
to write. 
 
Quandt suggests that I have written a “heroic” account of the PLO’s rise to international 
prominence. On this, I must disagree: rather than heroic, I argue that the PLO’s story was 
remarkable. Few groups in the twentieth century experienced such a meteoric rise. A mere 
eight years separated United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) – the 
blueprint for a Middle East peace that made absolutely no mention of the Palestinians – 
from the explosive “Zionism equals Racism” resolution, UNGA 3379 (1975). In that time, 
using meager resources, Yasir Arafat and his comrades managed to transform the 
Palestinian question from an afterthought to a cause célèbre in the international arena. I 
suspect that what Quandt – and to some degree Craig Daigle, in his review – are picking up 
on is one of my book’s shortcomings to which I freely admit: I am still torn over the best 
way to explain the paradoxical success of the PLO. How does one write about a group that 
managed to achieve so much with so few resources but nevertheless failed to achieve its 
paramount goal of creating a state? I do my best to answer this in my conclusion: “The case 
of the PLO highlighted both the possibilities and the dangers of an increasingly 
interconnected world order; it revealed the potential for globalized revolution and the 
limited ability of these cosmopolitan visions to reshape local realities” (267). 
 
Quandt is also skeptical of my take on Arafat’s involvement in the Black September 
Organization’s Munich and Khartoum Attacks. On this point, I fear that he has slightly 
1 See, for instance, Dina Mattar’s quite positive forthcoming review in Diplomatic History. 
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misread my argument. I do not argue that Arafat “knew nothing” of Black September’s 
actions. Rather, I make the case that Arafat and other PLO moderates viewed Black 
September as an internal rival: they understood the organization as a representing a 
challenge to their leadership and sought ways to dismantle it. I admit that the evidence in 
this regard is not conclusive and I would in fact not be shocked if materials were produced 
that showed that Arafat was indeed, as many of his critics have charged, the mastermind 
behind Black September. As it stands, however, the weight of the evidence suggests 
otherwise. Indeed, I have seen only one document – a summary produced by the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and research and published in FRUS – and a footnote 
based on that same document that argues that Arafat ordered the killings at Khartoum and 
neither presents substantive evidence.2 
 
David Korn’s Assassination in Khartoum, which Quandt mentions, is a fine book, but it too 
does not present documents demonstrating Arafat’s ultimate control over Black 
September. Indeed, Korn’s book discusses the well-known U.S. effort in 1985 to prosecute 
Arafat for the Khartoum killings. Spearheaded by Attorney General Edwin Meese, Assistant 
Attorney General John Bolton, and backed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC)– no fans of Palestinian nationalism, to be sure – the investigation failed to uncover 
anything besides unnamed “intelligence sources” and newspaper stories. As Korn explains, 
this “was not the stuff of evidence in an American court.”3 Any other potential evidence 
remains classified. And ultimately, when it comes to assessments of Arafat, I am not 
inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to Meese, Bolton, and AIPAC. 
 
I am reluctant, as a historian, to incriminate my subjects unless I have documentation. 
Likewise, with all due respect to U.S. government officials – and I hope that my regard for 
much of their work is evident in my book -- I try to do more than take the assessments of 
government officials as undisputed fact. This is of particular concern when partisan 
government officials are speculating about a supposed enemy. Certainly there are a large 
number of individuals and organizations that would be elated to present evidence of 
Arafat’s guilt to the public. But the fact remains that, after forty years, they have failed to do 
so. If such documents exist they should by all means be made public. But continued 
classification of documents does not provide a good reason for a scholar to assume guilt. 
Ultimately, the evidence that does exist, much of which is presented in my book, suggests 
that Arafat generally opposed Black September and was working to rein the organization 
in. This includes reports from U.S. State Department officers, statements from PLO leaders, 
as well as secondary work by historians and journalists. Thus, until more definitive 
evidence of Arafat’s involvement surfaces, I stand by my interpretation.  
 
2 Thanks to Craig Daigle for reminding me of the location of the former: “Intelligence Memorandum,” 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, E-6: 217; “Backchannel Message From the Egyptian 
Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs (Ismail) to the President’s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Kissinger),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, XXV: 41. 
3 David Korn, Assassination in Khartoum (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) 246. 
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Finally, I feel compelled to respond to Quandt’s more general critique of the field of 
international history. “By trying to paint on such a wide canvas,” he explains, “as 
international historians are bound to do, the author sometimes shortchanges important 
aspects of the story.” In this same vein, he charges that I present a “somewhat one 
dimensional” picture of the PLO. 4 Both of these criticisms are valid, up to a point, and both 
will sound familiar to international historians. Certainly, all international histories can be 
accused of sacrificing depth for breadth. Such works rarely provide the fine-grained detail 
of a local study but that is not, ultimately, why they are written. This also brings us back to 
Quandt’s wish that I had devoted more space to explaining the internal politics of the PLO. 
This is in fact something that I considered. But would such a discussion have made The 
Global Offensive a better book? I am not convinced. Rather, I suspect that the majority of my 
readers – most of whom are more likely to subscribe to H-Diplo than H-Mideast-Politics – 
are not eager to wade through an in depth examination of the doctrinal differences 
between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-External 
Operations, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command , a 
subject that I find to be interesting and important.. Furthermore, such a discussion would 
not ultimately be new. Indeed, any readers interested in finding works that devote the 
entirety of their attention to the internal politics of the PLO will find a number of fine 
examples in my bibliography.5  
 
Rather, I suspect that most of those who pick up my book are looking for a study that takes 
a wider perspective. The Global Offensive is not the definitive history of the PLO as an 
organization, but that is not what I intended it to be. If area study specialists find value in 
my book, I am gratified, since I remain deeply indebted to their excellent work on the local 
dimensions of the PLO’s story. I also believe that international, diplomatic, and military 
historians have much to gain by engaging with their colleagues in area studies. However, I 
remain convinced of the need for international histories that seek to build upon local and 
regional perspectives, place historical movements in their global setting, and draw 
connections between peoples in different parts of the world.  
 
My purpose in writing the book was to locate the Palestinian armed struggle on a global 
map, to contextualize that struggle in the twin processes of the Cold War and 
4 Quandt does suggest that it was possible to have conducted interviews with the few surviving PLO 
officials from the period, which is a fair point. However, given that I was operating with the meager resources 
of a young scholar, I made the decision that I would devote my shoestring research budget to time at the 
Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, reading the words that Palestinian officials wrote at the time rather 
than chasing the few remaining survivors of the period in hopes that they might remember some critical 
piece of information. I ultimately place more value in documents than in the recollections of interested 
parties.  
5 These include the outstanding work of scholars such as Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for 
State (Oxford University Press, 1997), Helena Cobban, Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), and Alain Gresh, PLO (Zed, 1985) – not to mention Quandt’s own seminal early work 
on the subject, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (University of California Press, 1973). 
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decolonization, to discuss the PLO’s impact on the international history of the post-1945 
era, and to trace the linkages between Palestinian fighters and other revolutionary groups 
around the postcolonial world. It was also my hope that the book might find a place on the 
shelf alongside the excellent works by international historians such as Odd Arne Westad, 
Erez Manela, Jeremi Suri, Matthew Connelly, Bradley Simpson, to name just a few – all of 
whose names appear in the reviews in this roundtable – that have appeared in recent 
years. 6 
 
Thanks very much to Douglas Little and the four reviewers for their thoughts on my book 
and to the editors of H-Diplo for all their work in putting this roundtable together. 
 
 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 United States License.  To view a copy of this license, visit 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ or send a letter to Creative 
Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, Mountain View, California, 94041, USA. 
6 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Erez Manela, The Wilsonian 
Moment (Oxford University Press, 2007), Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest (Harvard University Press, 2003), 
Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2002), and Bradley Simpson, Economists 
With Guns (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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